PPT An Introduction to Behavioral Finance PowerPoint presentation

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PPT An Introduction to Behavioral Finance PowerPoint presentation

An Introduction to Behavioral Finance

An Introduction to Behavioral Finance SIP Course on Stock Market Anomalies and Asset Management Professors S.P. Kothari and Jon Lewellen March 15, 2004 PowerPoint PPT presentation

Title: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance

An Introduction to Behavioral Finance

  • SIP Course on Stock Market Anomalies and Asset

Management

  • Professors S.P. Kothari and Jon Lewellen
  • March 15, 2004
  • An Introduction to Behavioral Finance

    • Efficient markets hypothesis
    • Large number of market participants
    • Incentives to gather and process information

    analysis until individual participants valuation

    is similar to the observed market price

  • Prices in such markets reflect information

    available to the participants, which means

    opportunities to earn above-normal rates of

    return on a consistent basis are limited

  • Prediction Stock returns are (almost) impossible

    to predict

  • Except that riskier securities on average earn

    higher rates of returns compared to less risky

    firms

  • An Introduction to Behavioral Finance

    • Behavioral finance
    • Widespread evidence of anomalies is inconsistent

    with the efficient markets theory

  • Bad models, data mining, and results by chance
  • Alternatively, invalid theory
  • Anomalies as a pre-cursor to behavioral finance
  • Challenge in developing a behavioral finance

    theory of markets

  • Evidence of both over- and under-reaction to

    events

  • Event-dependent over- and under-reaction, e.g.

    IPOs, dividend initiations, seasoned equity

    issues, earnings announcements, accounting

    accruals

  • Horizon dependent phenomenon short-term

    overreaction, medium-term momentum, and long-run

    overreaction

  • An Introduction to Behavioral Finance

    • Behavioral finance theory rests on the following

    three assumptions/characteristics

  • Investors exhibit information processing biases

    that cause them to over- and under-react

  • Individual investors errors/biases in processing

    information must be correlated across investors

    so that they are not averaged out

  • Limited arbitrage Existence of rational

    investors should not be sufficient to make

    markets efficient

  • Behavioral finance theories

    • Human information processing biases
    • Information processing biases are generally

    relative to the Bayes rule for updating our

    priors on the basis of new information

  • Two biases are central to behavioral finance

    theories

  • Representativeness bias (Kahneman and Tversky,

    1982)

  • Conservatism bias (Edwards, 1968).
  • Other biases Over confidence and biased

    self-attribution

  • Behavioral finance theories

    • Human information processing biases
    • Representativeness bias causes people to

    over-weight recent information and deemphasize

    base rates or priors

  • E.g. conclude too quickly that a yellow object

    found on the street is gold (i.e. ignore the low

    base rate of finding gold)

  • People over-infer the properties of the

    underlying distribution on the basis of sample

    information

  • For example, investors might extrapolate a firms

    recent high sales growth and thus overreact to

    news in sales growth

  • Representativeness bias underlies many recent

    behavioral finance models of market inefficiency

  • Behavioral finance theories

    • Human information processing biases
    • Conservatism bias Investors are slow to update

    their beliefs, i.e. they underweight sample

    information which contributes to investor

    under-reaction to news

  • Conservatism bias implies investor underreaction

    to new information

  • Conservatism bias can generate
  • short-term momentum in stock returns
  • The post-earnings announcement drift, i.e. the

    tendency of stock prices to drift in the

    direction of earnings news for three-to-twelve

    months following an earnings announcement also

    entails investor under-reaction

  • Behavioral finance theories

    • Human information processing biases
    • Investor overconfidence
    • Overconfident investors place too much faith in

    their ability to process information

  • Investors overreact to their private information

    about the companys prospects

  • Biased self-attribution
  • Overreact to public information that confirms an

    investors private information

  • Underreact to public signals that disconfirm an

    investors private information

  • Contradictory evidence is viewed as due to chance
  • Genrate underreaction to public signals
  • Behavioral finance theories

    • Human information processing biases
    • Investor overconfidence and biased

    self-attribution

  • In the short run, overconfidence and biased

    self-attribution together result in a continuing

    overreaction that induces momentum.

  • Subsequent earnings outcomes eventually reveal

    the investor overconfidence, however, resulting

    in predictable price reversals over long

    horizons.

  • Since biased self-attribution causes investors to

    down play the importance of some publicly

    disseminated information, information releases

    like earnings announcements generate incomplete

    price adjustments.

  • Behavioral finance theories

    • In addition to exhibiting information-processing

    biases, the biases must be correlated across

    investors so that they are not averaged out

  • People share similar heuristics
  • Focus on those that worked well in our

    evolutionary past

  • Therefore, people are subject to similar biases
  • Experimental psychology literature confirms

    systematic biases among people

  • Behavioral finance theories

    • Limited arbitrage
    • Efficient markets theory is predicated on the

    assumption that market participants with

    incentives to gather, process, and trade on

    information will arbitrage away systematic

    mispricing of securities caused by investors

    information processing biases

  • Arbitrageurs will earn only a normal rate of

    return on their information-gathering activities

  • Market efficiency and arbitrage EMH assumes

    arbitrage forces are constantly at work

  • Economic incentive to arbitrageurs exists only if

    there is mispricing, i.e. mispricing exists in

    equilibrium

  • Behavioral finance theories

    • Behavioral finance assumes arbitrage is limited.

    What would cause limited arbitrage?

  • Economic incentive to arbitrageurs exists only if

    there is mispricing

  • Therefore, mispricing must exist in equilibrium
  • Existence of rational investors must not be

    sufficient

  • Notwithstanding arbitrageurs, inefficiency can

    persist for long periods because arbitrage is

    costly

  • Trading costs Brokerage, B-A spreads, price

    impact/slippage

  • Holding costs Duration of the arbitrage and cost

    of short selling

  • Information costs Information acquisition,

    analysis and monitoring

  • Behavioral finance theories

    • Why cant large firms end limited arbitrage?
    • Arbitrage requires gathering of information about

    a firms prospects, spotting of mispriced

    securities, and trading in the securities until

    the mispricing is eliminated

  • Analysts with the information typically do not

    have the capital needed for trading

  • Firms (principals) supply the capital, but they

    must also delegate decision making (i.e.

    trading) authority to those who possess the

    information (agents)

  • Agents cannot transfer their information to the

    principal, so decisions must be made by those who

    possess information

  • Agents are compensated on the basis of outcomes,

    but the principal sets limits on the amount of

    capital at the agents disposal (the book)

  • Limited capital means arbitrage can be limited
  • Behavioral finance theories

    • Like the efficient markets theory, behavioral

    finance makes predictions about pricing behavior

    that must be tested

  • Need for additional careful work in this respect
  • Only then can we embrace behavioral finance as an

    adequate descriptor of the stock market behavior

  • Recent research in finance is in this spirit just

    as the anomalies literature documents

    inconsistencies with the efficient markets

    hypothesis

  • Stock Returns, Aggregate Earnings Surprises, and

    Behavioral Finance

    S.P. Kothari, Jonathan Lewellen, Jerold B.

    Warner     SIP Course on Stock Market Anomalies

    and Asset Management March 15, 2004

    Objective of the study

    • We study the relation between market index

    returns and aggregate earnings surprises

  • We focus on concurrent and lagged surprises
  • Do prices react slowly?
  • Is there discount rate information in aggregate

    earnings changes?

  • Motivation

    • At the firm level, post-earnings announcement

    drift is well-known

  • The slow adjustment to public information is

    inconsistent with market efficiency

  • Slow adjustment is consistent with behavioral

    finance

  • Barberis/Shleifer/Vishny (BSV, 1998)
  • Daniel/Hirshleifer/Subrahmanyam (DHS, 1998)
  • Hong/Stein (HS, 1999)
  • Aggregate return-earnings relation serves as an

    out-of-sample test of the behavioral hypothesis

    of investor underreaction

  • Literature concentrates on cross-sectional return

    predictability

  • We provide time-series evidence
  • Main findings

    • Aggregate relation does not mimic the firm-level

    relation

  • Market returns do not depend on past earnings

    surprises

  • Inconsistent with underreaction (or overreaction)
  • Market returns are negatively (not positively)

    related to concurrent earnings news

  • s seem economically significant
  • Earnings and interest/ discount rate shocks are

    positively correlated

  • Good aggregate earnings news can be bad news
  • Decomposing earnings changes does not fully

    eliminate the negative correlation between

    earnings news and returns, a troubling result

  • Firm level drift and behavioral models

    • Drift could occur if investors systematically

    ignore the time-series properties of earnings.

  • Bernard/Thomas (1990) show that quarterly

    earnings changes have positive serial dependence

    (.34,.19,.06 at the first 3 lags)

  • If investors underestimate the dependence, prices

    will respond slowly and they will be surprised by

    predictable changes in earnings.

  • Consistent with this, the pattern of trading

    profits at subsequent earnings announcements

    matches the autocorrelation pattern.

  • Evidence

    • Time-series properties of earnings
    • Stock returns and aggregate earnings surprises
    • Returns, earnings, and discount rates

    Earnings series

    • Compustat Quarterly database, 1970 2000
    • NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ stocks with
    • Earnings before ext. items, quarter t and t 4
    • Price, quarter t 4
    • Book value, quarter t 4
    •  Plus
    • December fiscal year end
    • Price gt 1
    • Exclude top and bottom 0.5 based on dE/P


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