The Diversification Puzzle Revisiting the Value Impact of Diversification for UK Firms
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Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 33(9) & (10), 1508–1534, November/December 2006, 0306-686x
doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5957.2006.00641.x
The Diversification Puzzle: Revisiting
the Value Impact of Diversification
for UK Firms
Edel Barnes and Gael Hardie-Brown*
Abstract:
and has examined industrial rather than geographic diversification. This study exploits the Lang
and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995) and Bodnar et al. (1999) methodologies and controls
for form of diversification in assessing value impact for a sample of UK firms, for the period
1996-2000. Using an adjusted value metric that controls for industry effects, we report a significant
diversification, value impact, internationalization, industry, risk
1. INTRODUCTION
Corporatediversificationinbothitsgeographicandindustrialdimensions,hasreceived
substantial attention from both the academic and business communities. However,
the literature has been skewed towards an examination of the industrial form of
diversification and has primarily focused on US firms. The extant theoretical literature
suggests a diversification puzzle. On the one hand the presence of diversification
along either dimension potentially provides a company with increased opportunity
and flexibility, plausible increments to value. On the other hand, again for both forms,
diversification beyond domestic, single activity operations introduces a complexity
to organisational structure that potentially increases agency-related concerns, with a
consequent diminution in value.
Empirical research in the area has identified a negative relationship between firm
value and US corporate industrial diversification (Lang and Stulz, 1994; and Berger
and Ofek, 1995) while Lins and Servaes (1999) document a similar relation across
a range of jurisdictions including Germany, Japan and the UK. A number of studies
*The authors are from the Department of Accounting, Finance and Information Systems, University College
Cork, Ireland. All errors and omissions remain the authors’ sole responsibility. (Paper received March 2006,
revised version accepted May 2006. Online publication August 2006)
Address for Correspondence: Edel Barnes, Department of Accounting, Finance, and Information Systems,
University College Cork, O’Rahilly Building, College Rd. Cork, Ireland.
e-mail: e.barnes@ucc.ie
C ?2006 The Authors
Journal compilationC ?2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK
and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
VALUE IMPACT OF DIVERSIFICATION FOR UK FIRMS
1509
have focused on identification of the drivers of this association (Rajan, Servaes and
Zingales, 2000; and Brusco and Panunzi, 2000), as well as evaluating its sensitivity to
industrial diversification type (Graham, Lemmon and Wolf, 1999). The value impact
of geographic diversification has received less attention, and again research has been
primarily restricted to the US environment. Such studies have identified a positive
relationship between firm value and geographic diversification for US firms (Errunza
and Senbet, 1981; and Morck and Yeung, 1991), while Reeb, Kwok and Baek (1998)
provideempiricalevidenceofapositiverelationshipbetweengeographicdiversification
and systematic risk. As many firms are both geographically and industrially diversified,
recent US research has examined the impact of geographic and industrial diversifica-
tion in a framework that controls for both forms of diversification (Bodnar, Tang and
Weintrop, 1999). Bodnar et al. provide further US evidence supporting the generally
held view that geographical (industrial) diversification is associated with a positive
(negative) value impact respectively. More recently the existence of a diversification
discount has been called into question (Martin and Sayrak, 2003), with a number of
studies now suggesting that industrial diversification may in fact create shareholder
value and to the extent that diversified firms trade at a discount, this may be due not
to the diversification decision per se, rather to characteristics of firms that make the
diversification choice.
The aim of this paper is initially to exploit an identified gap in the literature, by
exploring the UK value impact of geographic and industrial diversification in a model
that controls for both forms, and to revisit the diversification debate in light of recent
trends in the financial literature that call into question the perceived wisdom that
industrially diversified firms trade at a discount. In addition, evidence to suggest that
value creation occurs through geographic diversification may also be in doubt, in light
of the apparent failure of certain high profile UK firms to successfully implement a
globalexpansionstrategy.Thefirststageofourstudyappliesthemarkettobook(MTB)
methodology supported by Lang and Stulz (1994), updating it to control for both
forms of diversification (Bodnar et al. 1999). However, given evidence that anomalies
(‘puzzles’) with respect to valuation implications of other corporate financial decisions
may be rationalized by inadequate risk measurement (Eckbo, Masulis and Norli, 2000,
among others), our analysis is further refined by the addition of a control variable
for systematic risk (Reeb, Kwok and Baek, 1998). In this broad MTB analysis of the UK
market,consistentwithpriorUSstudies,wereportasignificantgeographic(industrial)
diversification premium (discount) of approximately 12% and 10% respectively.
Notwithstanding much anecdotal evidence that geographic diversification has often
been an ‘unhappy’ experience for UK firms, this stage of our analysis suggests there is
nothing fundamentally different in the broad UK market as compared to the US that
couldexplainsuchfailure.Perhapsitisjustalimitednumberof(possiblyskewing)firms
thatbuckthetrendandprovideevidenceoffailurethatiscontrarytotheUSexperience
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measure of value impact. Here our findings differ interestingly from the extant AVM
literature in respect of the US market and suggest a UK geographic diversification
discount of 14% and no significant UK industrial diversification value impact.
This subsection of the UK population is focused on a small number of industries
and it seems likely that ‘Industry’ type drives this apparent within-sample conflict,
which accords with our priors that the information content of industry has been vastly
under-exploited in the literature to date. We suggest that in the UK environment,
certain industries may be disproportionately sensitive to demographic and cultural
issues, which become more acute in the case of geographic diversification, for example
the ‘retail’ sector. This may account for the perverse geographic discount that appears
inconsistent with the extant literature that reflects a positive value impact of corporate
geographic diversification, and may also explain the apparent UK anomaly regarding
geographic diversification. It is possible that certain industries are disproportionately
represented in the failing globalisation strategies of certain UK firms so highly
publicisedinthefinancialpress.Thissectorinfluenceisanareanotpreviouslyexploited
in the geographic diversification literature. In consequence our second aim is to speak
directly to this theme by developing a decision choice model, conditional on the
diversification decision, which explains and potentially predicts diversification form
withahighdegreeofaccuracy.Specificallywefindsectoralcharacteristics,togetherwith
Size and contemporaneous Sales to be highly significant predictors of the dimension
of diversification choice for our sample of UK firms.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a review of
extantliteratureasitrelatestogeographicandindustrialdiversification,whileSection3
discussestheadjustedvaluemethodologyadoptedandspeakstosampleselectionissues.
Section 4 presents the results of our value impact assessment and Section 5 outlines,
implements and discusses our decision choice model and results thereof. Our final
section summarizes and concludes.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
(i) Geographic Diversification
The history of empirical research into the value impact of geographic diversification
canbetracedbacktotheworkofErrunzaandSenbet(1981),whowerefirsttoexamine
empirically the implications of geographic diversification for firm value. These authors
documentasignificantpositiverelationbetweeninternationalinvolvement(asproxied
by the foreign sales ratio) and excess value, which increases in barriers to capital flow,
suggesting that value impacts may be period specific and associated with changes in
economic indicators over time. Specifically there may be periods when multinational
firms provide ‘below market cost diversification services’ (Bodnar et al. 1999, p. 6).
VALUE IMPACT OF DIVERSIFICATION FOR UK FIRMS
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there is little shareholder protection in domestic markets and external financing
is difficult. In such cases, there can frequently be a diversification premium as the
benefits of corporate diversification outweigh the agency-related costs, which contrasts
with evidence of a diversification discount among high-income countries where capital
markets are integrated and well developed.
Reeb, Kwok and Baek (1998) provide evidence of a very significant positive relation-
ship between systematic risk and international diversification, which suggests that the
internationaldiversificationbenefitofreducedcashflowcorrelationmaybedominated
by other negative influences that increase overall firm volatility of returns and in
consequence increase systematic risk. This suggests a value discount, ceteris paribus,
for internationally diversifying firms. Foreign exchange and political risk, increased
asymmetricinformationandmanagementself-fulfillingpropheciesrepresentpotential
negative influences that may enhance systematic risk of internationalised firms. This is
consistent with anecdotal evidence that managers often use a higher hurdle rate when
assessing international projects, in consequence frequently accepting riskier projects,
suchthattheconceptofincreasinglyriskyinternationalprojectsbecomesaself-fulfilling
prophecy.Reebetal.concedehowever,thatanincreaseinsystematicriskassociatedwith
international diversification may equally be due to comparatively higher indigenous
betas within the international countries under review.
(ii) Industrial Diversification
Empiricalresearchintoindustrialdiversificationdatesbacktothe1930s(Coase,1937),
althoughtheimplicationsofdecreasedfocusforcorporatevaluehaveremainedlargely
unexplored until the 1990s. Lang and Stulz (1994) are the first to focus on value, as
distinct from the performance implications of industrial diversification, and identify a
negative relationship between US industrial diversification and value as measured by
both Tobin’s q and Market to Book, which persists even when an industry adjusted
value metric (AVM or chop shop approach) is utilised. Berger and Ofek (1995)
examine the potential source of these value losses and provide evidence that a greater
propensity to over-invest is associated with a lower value for industrially diversified
firms. They also find that subsidization of poorly performing segments contributes to
this diversification value loss, and identify a reduction in the diversification discount
in related, as opposed to unrelated diversification, which supports the relevance of
economies of scale and leveraging of intangible assets such as managerial expertise to
achieve operating efficiency. They conclude that an industrial diversification strategy
could produce small benefits in the form of increased debt capacity and tax savings
given proper controls for over-investment and cross-subsidization.
Rajan,ServaesandZingales(2000)confronttheargumentthatindustrialdiversifica-
tion destroys value through over-investment in value-destroying projects, by exploring
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and the bright side of internal capital markets’ (Brusco and Panunzi, 2000, p.19).
In the context of US-based studies, Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (1999) explore the
sensitivityoftheindustrialdiscounttodiversificationtype,onthedimensionsoforganic
versus acquired investment and provide empirical evidence to suggest that organic
diversification does not result in a decline in value.
Iforganicdiversificationisrelatedtocorefirmactivities,thesefindingsareconsistent
withBergerandOfek(1995)andwithRumelt(1974),whoarguethatrelatedindustrial
diversification is beneficial from a skills and resource utilisation perspective. However,
Graham et al. (1999) find evidence that diversification through acquisition does result
in such a discount, and show that about half of this value loss derives from the fact that
the acquired firms are already priced at a discount to their industry prior to merger.
This is an interesting point as the majority of prior studies have dismissed self-selection
inindustrialdiversificationwhenfocusingonthecharacteristicsoftheacquiringfirms.1
Infocusingonacquiredfirms,theirstudyidentifiesanalternativeformofself-selection
that can account for some but not all, of the discount.
LinsandServaes(1999)examinetheimpactofindustrialdiversificationaspartofan
internationalstudyencompassingtheUK,GermanyandJapan,anddocumentevidence
of an industrial diversification discount of approximately 15% in the UK for the years
1992and1994acrossasampleofapproximately700UKfirms.2Incontrasttothis paper
their analysis fails to control for geographic diversification in assessing diversification
value impact. This study reports a discount of 10% in a UK model controlling for both
forms of diversification.
(iii) Combined View
Similar theoretical arguments pertain to the relationship between both geographic
and industrial forms of diversification and firm value. Both point to potential agency-
related value losses even though industrial diversification literature also explores the
concept of internal power struggles, which might be considered a further aspect to
agency conflicts. Both literatures identify potential value gains resulting from less well-
correlated cash flows, related tax savings, increased debt capacity or the provision of
a shareholder diversification service. Exploitation of intangibles is also identified as
a potential benefit in both forms of diversification. Geographic diversification speaks
to the theory of internalisation, while industrial diversification speaks to the idea of
related rather than unrelated diversification. Agency and corporate control concerns
appear to be dominant negative influences in industrial diversification, whereas the
literature on geographic diversification identifies exploitation of intangible assets
(internalisation) as the dominant and positive influence on value. Neither literature
centrally considers the relevance of systematic risk however, which is likely to be
positively related to geographic diversification (Reeb et al. 1998). This suggests that
the relationship between value and geographic diversification may be negative if risk-
adjusted internationalising projects fail to generate sufficient incremental cash flow.
1 Campa and Kedia (2001) address centrally the endogeneity of the diversification decision, and provide
evidence of self-selection and of a negative correlation between firm value and a firm’s choice to diversify.
2 This international study includes Japan, where firms primarily report financial results for the year ended
31 March, unlike the UK where firms primarily use a 31 December year-end. Though not directly addressed
by Lins and Servaes (1999), it appears that 1993 was omitted to avoid cross over periods, 31 March being
used as the reporting date for the 1992 Japanese sample.
C ?2006 The Authors
Journal compilationC ?Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006
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VALUE IMPACT OF DIVERSIFICATION FOR UK FIRMS
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Bodnar,TangandWeintrop(1999)examinethevalueimpactofdiversificationusing
a combined framework that controls for both forms of corporate diversification, using
the basic models of Errunza and Senbet (1981) and Lang and Stulz (1994). Controls
for both diversification forms are critical in identifying the direction and extent of the
impact of the omitted geographic diversification variable on industrial diversification
discountestimates.Bodnaretal.examineasampleofapproximately7,000USfirmsfor
the period 1984 to 1997, results for which are consistent in direction but different in
magnitude to earlier studies. Specifically they report evidence of a 2.7% value premium
for geographic diversification and a 6% value discount for industrial diversification.
(iv) Recent Trends
Martin and Sayrak (2003) note the conventional wisdom that corporate industrial
diversificationdestroysshareholderwealth,thatdiversifiedfirmssellatavaluediscount
and that these effects are particularly pronounced for conglomerates, yet make the
point that many US corporations both choose to diversify and to remain highly
diversified. This observation is equally valid for the UK where large multinationals
tend to dominate any sample of listed firms. Recent refinements in methodology
have called into question the perceived wisdom that industrial diversification destroys
corporate value. These authors cite Graham et al. (1999), Hyland (1999), Campa and
Kedia (1999) and Villalonga (1999a) all of whom argue that industrially diversified
firms may be inherently different from domestic, single-activity firms before choosing
to diversify, so that subsequent value losses may be associated with characteristics of
diversifying firms rather than to the diversification decision per se. Controlling for
3. METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTION OF DATA
(i) Data
Segmental reporting is our basis for identifying those firms that are geographically
(multi-national) and/or industrially diversified (multi-activity) for the purposes of this
study. Geographic and industrial segmental information as mandated by SSAP No. 25
BARNES AND HARDIE-BROWN
from foreign sources. As we focus centrally on the presence rather than extent of
diversification, lack of consistency in annual reporting of business segment data is
not expected to qualitatively impact on either analysis or results.3We are constrained
to examining a relatively short sample period here essentially because segmental
information before 1996 is patchy at best, and we recognize the limitations of this
sampling approach.
Breakdown of company sales (turnover), by geographic and industrial segment for
the five corporate reporting year-ends within the period 31 December, 1996 to 31
December,2000,inclusive,wasobtainedfromDatastream?foroursample.TheSEDOL
number allocated by the LSE was chosen as a unique firm identifier to facilitate data
matching across firms, while for core industry matching, key to the Adjusted Value
Measure (AVM) methodology as applied by Lang and Stulz (1994), the three-digit
FTSE industry sub-sector code was utilized. Consistent with Lins and Servaes (1999)
we confine our sample to those non-financial firms listed on the FTSE All Share Index
at March 2001, breadth of index serving to minimize survivorship bias concerns. We
furtherexcludefirmswithsalesoflessthanstg£30mperannum,theseselectioncriteria
being applied annually so that firms are not necessarily included in our sample every
year.
Our‘broadsample’usedfortheMTBregression,thuscomprises495firms,andwhen
selected from the five-year period 1996 to 2000, contains 1,628 firm year observations,
implying an attrition rate of 35% (34%) for individual firms (firm year observations
overall) respectively.4For the second restricted regression, the AVM methodology
requires that each firm year observation have an industry benchmark within the
single-activity domestic category (NN), a difficult requirement to meet within the
context of the UK market. In any year, only those observations with at least four
firm year observations in the NN category in that year formed the ‘restricted sample’,
further reducing our original population of 1,628 to 337 firm year observations or
approximately 21%. Total sales, earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), long term
debt, total assets, net fixed assets, capital expenditure, research and development
expenditure (DS code 119), cash flow, market value, market to book ratio, volatility,
shareholders funds, number of industry firms and SEDOL codes were obtained from
Datastream?for this ‘restricted sample’ for 1996 to 2000 inclusive. We also obtain a
measure of company age since incorporation for all firms in our sample.5
3 Rajan et al. (2000) highlight the problem of inconsistency in annual reporting of business segment data
and SSAP No. 25 provides scope for strategic segmental changes that are a matter of reporting rather than
fundamental changes in business focus. However, directors are more likely to make strategic changes to the
degree of diversification rather than to report diversification (none) where it does not (does) exist.
4 An included firm may have less than five firm year observations where either the SSAP25 10% threshold
was not met, directors exercised discretion in disclosure on grounds of potential prejudice to firm interests,
the firm was not publicly listed for the 5-year period, the turnover or financial services test was failed or the
firm had not yet filed financial statements for a reporting date falling within the calendar year 2000.
5 Computing variables based on calendar year end data rather than on firm specific year end data can give
rise to a distorting mis-match between market values and accounting data (Bodnar et al. 1999) however, it
ensures comparability in firm value measurement. Bodnar notes that use of firm-specific year-end market
values has no qualitative impact on their findings.
C ?2006 The Authors
Journal compilationC ?Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006
Page 8
VALUE IMPACT OF DIVERSIFICATION FOR UK FIRMS
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(ii) Market to Book Value Measure (MTB)
Consistent with Lang and Stulz (1994) Market to Book (MTB) is defined as follows:
where MTBi,tis the Market to Book for firm i at time t, MVEi,tis the Market Value of
(4)
where Mf ,tis the Industry Multiplier for FTSE industry code f. at time t, MedianNN
is the median of the observations, in the NN category, MVEi,f ,tis the Market Value of
Equity for NN category firm i, within FTSE industry code f. at time t, BVLi,f ,tis the
Book Value of Total Liabilities for NN category firm i within FTSE industry code f. at
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BARNES AND HARDIE-BROWN
range of industry classifications, which is feasible within the limitations of our UK
sample of NN firms. On the one hand this sacrifices the high degree of granularity
achieved for US AVM studies, however, on the other hand it facilitates establishment
of a restricted sample, which allows a focused review of a subset of UK industries.
For both the broad and restricted population of firm year observations each is
split into four sub-groups of domestic single activity (NN), multinational single activity
(YN), domestic multi-activity (NY) and multinational multi-activity (YY) observations.
The MTB and AVM metrics are then computed according to equation (1) and (2)