Conventional wisdom suggests that independent boards limit earnings distortions and promote accurate reporting. In contrast, this study indicates that having insiders on boards enhances reporting integrity. The central result is that strengthening board independence curtails earnings.

More than a decade has passed since Enron highlighted the dangers of earnings management and weak corporate governance. Yet egregious examples such as Lehman continue to plague capital markets, causing investors to wonder if corporate governance really matters in the critical task of controlling.

Because environmental information reporting remains voluntary on an international scale, there are major difference in terms of quality and quantity of environmental information, reported by entities from varied sectors and countries. Within this study, I have focused on internal.

This study explores whether, and to what extent, internal corporate governance mechanisms matter in inducing more informative stock pricing in such an emerging market as China where external governance mechanisms are relatively weak. Empirical evidence indicates that insider ownership tends to.

In this paper, we investigate the role that disclosure quality plays in the accurate valuation of accruals and cash flow. We predict that stock prices of firms with higher-quality disclosures more accurately reflect the persistence of accruals and cash flow. We test our predictions using analyst.

Agency theory suggests that managerial mischief may occur when the interests of owners and managers diverge and that a solution to this agency problem is alignment of owner and agent interests through agent compensation and equity ownership. We develop the theoretical concept of CEO return and.

We study how corporate governance affects firm value through the decision of whether to fire or retain the chief executive officer (CEO). We present a model in which weak governance-which prevents shareholders from controlling the board-protects inferior CEOs from dismissal, while at the same.

We investigate whether retiring CEOs engage in opportunistic terminalyear forecasting behavior and the circumstances in which such behavior is likely to be more or less pronounced. Using a within-CEO empirical design, we find that retiring CEOs are more likely to issue forecasts of future.